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        OPINION OF THE COURT
          
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
James E. Holden appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus as untimely.  We exercise plenary review over that determination. 
Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and for the reasons that follow, will reverse and remand.
I.
Holden was convicted by a jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,
Pennsylvania of robbery and conspiracy. The Court sentenced him to a term of between
twenty and forty years imprisonment.  After exhausting his state remedies, on April 23,
2002 Holden filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
The District Court gave Holden the option of having his petition ruled upon as filed or
withdrawing the petition without prejudice and refiling “one all-inclusive § 2254 petition
3within the one-year statutory period prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act.”  (J.A. at 41a) (“AEDPA”).  Holden withdrew his petition and on March 14,
2003 filed a second habeas petition.  On April 14, 2003, the District Court, as part of its
preliminary consideration under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts, dismissed that petition sua sponte as untimely under
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.  The District Court did not give Holden prior
notice nor the opportunity to be heard.  This appeal followed.
II. 
Holden argues that the District Court should have warned him that if he withdrew
his first petition, any future petition might be barred by the statute of limitations.  He
argues in the alternative that the District Court did not have the power to summarily
dismiss his petition as untimely, but even if it did, he should have been given notice and
an opportunity to be heard.  We address each contention in turn.
A.
Before a District Court may rule on a section 2254 petition from a pro se
petitioner, it must notify the petitioner that he may: (1) have his petition ruled on as filed,
or (2) withdraw the petition and file one all-inclusive § 2254 petition “within the one year
statutory period.”  Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 2000); see United States
v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding the same for a section 2255 petition). 
This notice is required “out of a sense of fairness,” Mason, 208 F.3d at 418, because of
  The Court handed down its decision on June 21, 2004, after briefing had been1
completed.  Therefore, the specifics of the Pliler decision were not addressed in the briefs.
Counsel for Holden did note in his brief that certiorari had been granted, and on July 28,
2004 filed an appropriate Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter informing this Court that the Supreme
Court had vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
4
AEDPA’s restrictive effect on successive habeas petitions.  
The District Court gave the required notice.  Specifically, it informed Holden that
he could withdraw his petition without prejudice and resubmit “one all-inclusive § 2254
petition within the one-year statutory period prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act.”  (J.A. at 41a).  Holden then withdrew his first, timely petition,
refiling a second, but untimely one.  The District Court, as part of its Rule 4 preliminary
consideration, then dismissed the resubmitted petition as untimely.  Holden asserts that by
giving him the Miller/Mason election notice, the District Court unintentionally misled
him into thinking he had time to withdraw his original petition and file another within the
prescribed statute of limitations period.  He argues that a District Court giving this
election notice must warn a pro se petitioner that the statute of limitations might bar any
successive petitions.  Holden’s argument, however sympathetic, appears to have been
recently rejected by the Supreme Court.
In Pliler v. Ford, 124 S.Ct. 2441 (2004),  the Supreme Court reversed a decision1
by the Ninth Circuit requiring district courts to give pro se habeas petitioners a warning
that if they dismiss their petitions in order to first exhaust state remedies, AEDPA’s
statute of limitations might bar them from refiling a future petition in federal court. 
  As we note below, however, the District Court is free to consider whether the2
circumstances of this case call for equitable tolling.  See infra, note 4.
5
According to the Ninth Circuit, the failure to provide the pro se habeas petitioner in that
case with such a warning deprived him of the opportunity to make a “meaningful” choice
concerning his petition.  Id. at 2445 (citation omitted).  The Supreme Court disagreed.  It
held that district courts need not warn pro se litigants that AEDPA’s statute of limitations
might preclude them from filing any future petitions if they withdraw a timely petition. 
Id. at 2446.  According to the Court, explaining habeas procedure and calculating the
statute of limitations are tasks normally reserved for trained counsel, and “[r]equiring
district courts to advise a pro se litigant in such a manner would undermine the district
judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.”  Id.
This Court is bound by the holding in Pliler that no warning concerning the statute
of limitations is required.  It is easy to see how Holden, a pro se petitioner, might have
been confused by the District Court’s election notice, and how he might have thought the
statute of limitations would not bar his resubmitted petition.  Nevertheless, because the
Pliler decision is controlling, we cannot say the District Court erred by giving the
Miller/Mason election notice.2
B.
The District Court dismissed Holden’s petition as untimely as part of its initial
Rule 4 consideration.  Holden asserts that the District Court lacked the authority to do so. 
6We recently rejected that contention in our en banc decision United States v. Bendolph,
01-2468 (3d Cir. filed May 16, 2005).  We held in Bendolph that a district court possesses
the authority to raise AEDPA’s statute of limitations sua sponte during its initial
consideration of a petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
in the United States District Courts.  Id.  In so holding, we followed every other Court of
Appeals to have considered the authority bestowed upon a district court by Rule 4.  See
e.g., Scott v. Collins, 286 F.3d 923, 930 (6th Cir. 2002); Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701,
706 (4th Cir. 2002); Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2001); Acosta v.
Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2000); Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir.
1999).  Thus, the district court did not err by raising the statute of limitations sua sponte.
We also held in Bendolph, however, that prior to a summary dismissal by the
district court, a habeas petitioner must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Bendolph, 01-2468; accord Hill, 277 F.3d at 707 (“[W]e believe justice requires the
district court to give the pro se § 2254 petitioner prior notice and an opportunity to
respond.”);  Scott, 286 F.3d at 930; Herbst, 260 F.3d at 1043; Acosta, 221 F.3d at 121. 
As Holden points out, it may not be plainly apparent from the face of a
petition—particularly from a pro se petitioner—whether the statute of limitations has run. 
(Holden Br. At 11).  For instance, equitable tolling may be appropriate.  Cf. Robinson v.
Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding AEDPA’s statute of limitations is
subject to equitable tolling).  Thus, in order to ensure the accuracy of a holding that a
  The government’s argument that the District Court’s error was harmless because3
Holden could have been heard via a motion for reconsideration is without merit.  That
argument has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit.  In Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d at 1044, the
Court held “a motion for reconsideration is not an adequate substitute opportunity for a
habeas petition to respond when a district court sua sponte dismisses the petition on the basis
of untimeliness.”
  On remand, the District Court may consider whether the giving of the Miller/Mason4
election notice constitutes grounds for equitable tolling.  Cf. Pliler, 124 S.Ct. at 2448
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[I]f the petitioner is affirmatively misled, either by the court or
by the State, equitable tolling might well be appropriate.”).
petition is time-barred, before a district court may summarily dismiss a habeas petition, it
must afford a habeas petitioner notice and an opportunity to argue why the petition is
timely.  By failing to provide Holden with this procedural safeguard, the District Court
erred.   We will reverse and remand for a hearing on the applicability of AEDPA’s statute3
of limitations.4
III.
The District Court did not err by giving Holden the Miller/Mason election notice. 
Nor did it err by considering AEDPA’s statute of limitations sua sponte.  It did err,
however, by failing to afford Holden with notice and an opportunity to be heard before it
summarily dismissed his habeas petition as untimely.  Accordingly, we will reverse and
remand for a hearing on the applicability of AEDPA’s statute of limitations.
